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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
    
 
     No. 13-3155 
    
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JIMMIL HENDERSON a/k/a JAMIL HENDERSON 
 
 
JIMMIL HENDERSON, 
                     Appellant 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                            
(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00410-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez                      
                                                                 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 7, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 1, 2014) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, Jimmil Henderson challenges his conviction following a trial before 
2 
 
the District Court.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment of conviction. 
I. Background 
Because the facts are well known to the parties, we will discuss them only briefly. 
After a foot chase, police arrested Henderson on February 18, 2011.  At the time 
of arrest, Henderson was carrying five zip lock bags containing marijuana, one zip lock 
bag containing five vials of cocaine, and $254 in cash.  A gun was also retrieved, which 
Henderson discarded during the chase.   
On August 24, 2012, Henderson was indicted on three counts:  possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(C), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  On January 30, 2013, after a five-day bifurcated trial, a jury found 
Henderson guilty on all three counts.   
II. Discussion1 
Henderson alleges that the District Court 1) erred and violated his Due Process 
Rights by excluding testimony pertaining to his participation in a court diversionary 
program, 2) erred in admitting evidence of two of Henderson’s prior convictions for 
possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, and 3) erred in refusing his 
request for a jury instruction regarding the lesser included offense of possession of a 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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controlled substance.  We see no error in the District Court’s actions.   
A. Evidentiary Rulings   
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, though we exercise plenary 
review over a district court’s construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  United 
States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).  “An abuse of discretion occurs only 
where the district court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable – in short, 
where no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.”  Id.   
1. Exclusion of Testimony 
Henderson contends that the District Court erred in denying testimony regarding 
his participation in a court diversionary program by concluding that it was irrelevant 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.  Relying on Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 
F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1992), Henderson also contends that the exclusion was a violation of 
his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.   
Rule 401 instructs that evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  The exclusion of 
testimonial evidence amounts to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory 
process when the testimony is relevant, and when it would have been “both material and 
favorable to [the defendant’s] defense.”  Mills, 956 F.2d at 446 (emphasis in original).  
Here, the District Court neither abused its discretion nor violated Henderson’s right to 
compulsory process.  
 Henderson sought to admit the testimony of Maria Casado, the custodian of 
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records and director of classification at Delaney Hall—a facility which offers court 
diversionary programming aimed at changing addictive and criminal behavior by 
providing drug treatment, job training, GED preparation, parenting classes, and other 
services.  Henderson alleges that Ms. Casado’s testimony would show that Henderson 
had a drug problem, and thus, support the theory that the drugs in his possession at the 
time of arrest were for personal use rather than distribution.  However, Ms. Casado’s 
testimony was limited to the dates during which Henderson received services at Delaney 
Hall.  Ms. Casado does not have personal knowledge, nor does Delaney Hall have 
records, regarding whether Henderson actually participated in drug treatment or whether 
Henderson was referred to Delaney Hall due to a drug problem.  Not only is this 
testimony not helpful in establishing that Henderson had a drug problem, it also provides 
no support for the contention that the drugs in his possession at the time of arrest were for 
personal use.
2
  Therefore, the District Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding 
the testimony as irrelevant.  Furthermore, because the testimony is irrelevant, it does not 
amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.  
2. Admission of Prior Convictions  
 Henderson also contends that the District Court erred in admitting as evidence two 
prior convictions for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances.  Both 
convictions were based on arrests in 2006 that occurred near the area of Lincoln Park in 
                                                 
2
   Henderson contends that Casado’s testimony would show that Henderson underwent 
drug treatment because treatment was mandatory for anyone in the program for more 
than 21 days.  Even so, mandatory drug treatment based on length of program 
participation is not probative of whether an individual has a drug problem. 
5 
 
Newark, New Jersey.  At the time of the first arrest, Henderson was in possession of 23 
vials of cocaine, 13 decks of heroin, and $213 in cash.  At the time of the second arrest, 
Henderson was in possession of 32 vials of cocaine, 46 folds of heroin, and $169 in cash.  
Henderson contends that the prior convictions are not “sufficiently similar to the instant 
offense as to demonstrate motive or intent” in that the prior convictions did not involve 
marijuana and one of the prior convictions involved an accomplice or co-conspirator.  
Henderson also contends that the use of both convictions “crossed the line from being 
offered for a proper purpose and to improperly demonstrate a propensity to commit the 
crime charged.”  Id.   
To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior crimes must have a proper 
evidentiary purpose, be relevant under Rule 401, satisfy the Rule 403 balancing test, and, 
when requested, be accompanied by a limiting instruction about the purpose for which 
the jury may consider it.  United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, 
the District Court properly exercised its discretion in determining that each requirement 
was satisfied.   
Intent and motive are both proper purposes under Rule 404(b)(2) and relevant 
under Rule 401 given the defense’s theory that the drugs in Henderson’s possession were 
for personal use.  With expert testimony, the government established that drugs packaged 
for distribution are divided up into small increments and cost substantially more than 
when they are sold in bulk.  The prior convictions establish that Henderson would have 
had knowledge of this fact.  In other words, Henderson's prior convictions are at least 
minimally relevant to establishing that he was aware that drugs were distributed in small 
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vials of the kind he possessed upon arrest, making it more likely that he intended to 
distribute those drugs.  The differences Henderson highlights between the present case 
and the prior convictions are irrelevant to this consideration.   
Additionally, the District Court determined under Rule 403 that the probative 
value of the convictions weighed in favor of admission because the government 
established a proper purpose.  Contrary to Henderson’s contention, admission of both 
convictions, as opposed to just one, neither makes for an improper purpose, nor weighs in 
favor of exclusion under Rule 403.  As we have previously instructed, Rule 404(b) 
operates as a “rule of inclusion rather than exclusion,” where admission is favored if the 
evidence is relevant for any purpose other than propensity to commit a crime.  See United 
States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2003).    
The final requirement for Rule 404(b) was satisfied when the District Court 
instructed the jury that it could consider the prior convictions only “in deciding whether 
the defendant had the plan, knowledge or intent necessary to commit the crime charged in 
the indictment,” and “not . . . as proof that the defendant had a bad character or any 
propensity to commit crimes.”  A1106-07.  Accordingly, we find that the District Court 
properly exercised its discretion in admitting the prior convictions under Rule 404(b).   
B. Jury Instruction 
 
Finally, Henderson contends that the District Court erred in denying his request to 
give a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled 
substance.  In lieu of a jury instruction, the District Court added the lesser included 
offense to the verdict form.  Because Henderson failed to object to this substitution, we 
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review for plain error.
3
  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 
1991).   
The District Court must provide a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, if it 
is supported by the evidence.  United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 
2010).  However, as is the case here, when the lesser offense is included on the special 
verdict form this mandate does not apply.  Id. at 205.  Accordingly, we find no error. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction. 
                                                 
3
 The Government contends that Henderson waived his right to raise this issue pursuant 
to the invited error doctrine.  See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quotations omitted).  However, this doctrine is inapplicable because Henderson 
neither invited nor induced the District Court to omit the jury instruction. 
